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ORAL AND SEALED BIDDING, EFFICIENCY
VERSUS EQUITYt
EDWARD M. MILLERtt
This article will assess the equity and efficiency implications of
oral versus competitive bidding for governmental sales and purchases,
explore patterns of bidder behavior and their bidding procedures,
and propose a new procedure for competitive sales that combines
desirable features of both. The discussion will concentrate on sales of
timber from the National Forests both because the problem has been
intensively discussed in this context, and because both methods have
been used for timber sales. The discussion will be later extended to
cover sales of other natural resources, and the even more common
cases of government purchases of goods and services.
In sealed bidding each bidder is allowed to submit one bid which
he seals in an envelope prior to the appointed time for opening bids.
At that time the bids are opened, and the timber is sold to the firm
that offered the highest amount. This procedure is commonly used
for sales of Eastern timber, for most sales of government-owned
mineral resources, and for government procurements.
Oral bidding is an auction. Those interested in a particular lot of
timber assemble together at the time of the sale. A potential buyer
states an offer for the timber. If another is willing to pay more, he
makes a higher offer which in turn may be topped. When an offer is
made that no one is willing to exceed, the sale is made at this price to
the person who made this last offer.
t Work began on the efficiency effects of different bidding systems when the author was
with Abt Associates as Principal Investigator for a study of Fuel Minerals on the Public
Lands commissioned by the Public Land Law Review Commission. The author is heavily
indebted to Professor Mead of the University of California at Santa Barbara who did much
of the pioneering work on the economics of the timber industry and the significance of
different bidding systems. Professor Mead's work has appeared in one book, Mead, Competi-
tion and Oligopsony in the Douglas Fir Lumber Industry 199, (1966), and in a journal
article, Mead, Natural Resource Disposal Policy-Oral Auction Versus Sealed Bids, Natural
Resource J. 194-224 (1967). (These are referred to here as the book and the article
respectively.) The reader is referred to these excellent discussions for additional information
on the economics of the timber industry, or a description of Forest Service procedures that
goes beyond the brief outline included here.
There is also a detailed description of current timber sale procedures in the Study of
Public Land Timber Policy prepared for the Public Land Law Review Commission by
George Banzhof & Company (April 1969).
ttThe author is currently an economist in the Office of Systems Analysis and Informa-
tion in the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, Washington, D.C.
ORAL AND SEALED BIDDING
REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFICIENCY
Before considering the effects of bidding systems on efficiency it
is necessary to discuss the necessary conditions for efficiency. The
primary requirement is that timber harvesting and processing be done
by the firm with the lowest marginal costs. Which firm has the lowest
marginal costs for a particular stand of timber will depend on the
distance between the firm's sawmills and the stand of timber, on the
size and species of the timber, and on other factors that will vary
with the lot being sold. If there is excess capacity so that the timber
can be harvested without having to increase saw mill capacity, the
marginal costs will be short-run marginal costs excluding any capital
charges on fixed investment. If the firm already has access to suf-
ficient timber to keep its plant operating at capacity, and any addi-
tional purchases of timber would require an expansion of the plant,
the marginal costs must include a return on this capital.
The maximum amount that a firm is willing to pay for standing
timber is the difference between the price it can sell lumber for and
its marginal cost for converting timber into lumber. If it offers more
it will experience a loss. (Of course, if it can it will offer less.)
The market for lumber is close to being perfectly competitive with
a large number of buyers competing nationwide.' Since all firms can
sell their lumber for the same price, it follows that the firm with the
lowest cost will also be the firm with the highest ability to pay for
timber. Thus any sales method that directs the timber to the firm
with the highest ability to pay will insure that production is per-
formed by the firm with the lowest cost. Notice that efficiency
requires merely that the low cost firm win the bidding, not that it
pay any particular price.
ORAL BIDDING
By the above standards, oral bidding is an efficient method for
selling timber. The firm with the highest ability and willingness to
pay will normally win the bidding. If another firm threatens to take
the timber with a price lower than the maximum the low cost firm is
willing to pay, this firm will raise its bid. If the price is above a firms
willingness to pay, it will not raise the bid. This will indicate that it is
not the firm with the highest willingness to pay, and not the firm with
the lowest cost.
1. W. Mead, Competition and Oligopsony in the Douglas Fir Industry (1966).
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SEALED BIDDING
With sealed bidding, there is an appreciable risk that the low cost
firm will not be the winner. A higher cost firm will win whenever the
low cost firm underestimates the amount other firms will bid. Given
the difficulty of anticipating bids, such errors can be expected to be
frequent.
To indicate why such errors are to be expected let us examine the
behavior of a profit-maximizing firm in sealed bidding. If it knew the
amounts other firms would be bidding, its strategy would be to bid
just slightly more.2 If this amount exceeded its maximum willingness
to pay, no bid would be made.
In practice, there is not such knowledge about bidding plans of
competitors. All the bidder has are estimates of the probability that
he will win by bidding certain amounts in any particular sales.3 The
bidder's goal will normally be to maximize his expected profit. This
is the product of his probability of winning the bidding and the
profit if he does win the bidding. The profit is the sales price of the
lumber produced minus the costs of production and minus the
amount paid for the timber.
Let x be the bid price
p(x) the probability of winning with a bid at that price
C the cost of the bidding firm
L the price of lumber
M the maximum willingness to pay of the bidder
P the profit
As
M = L-C
P = L-C-x
= M-x if the bid submitted is the high bid
The expected value for profit is P X p(x) or
(M-x) p(x)
The bidding firm will select x so as to maximize the expected profit
which requires that:
3[p(x) (M-x)] = ap(x) (M-x) - p(x)= 0
ax ax
ap(x) = P(x)
ax M-x
2. Of course the bidder may be aware that the amounts that other firms will bid in future
sales will depend on the amounts that he bids in this sale. This complexity will be disre-
garded in this introductory discussion.
3. In practice such probability estimates may not be made explicit. Indeed, the bidder
may deny that he has any such estimates.
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In general, the probability of winning the bidding will be less than
one. Thus, with sealed bidding, there will be cases in which the less
efficient firm wins the bidding and receives the timber. The primary
reason for this is the difficulty of predicting the bids of opponents.
THE ARGUMENT IN GRAPHIC FORM
In Diagram 1 the curve GAF indicates the firm's estimated prob-
ability of winning as a function of the amount bid. The higher it bids
the better its chance of winning. The firm's maximum willingness to
pay is M. The profit4 if it wins with a bid of X is M-X. With a bid of X,
the probability of winning is estimated to be A. The expected profit
is then A(M-X), which is the area of the rectangle ABMX. The profit
maximizing firm will select its bid so as to maximize the expected
profit, or the area ABMX.
One should notice that the amount of the bid X will always be
below M if the firm is bidding. The fact that it is bidding indicates
that its expected profit is positive. For a positive expected profit the
area ABMX is positive which means its base must have a finite length,
i.e., the firm will never bid its maximum willingness to pay, unless
the goal is to eliminate a competitor.
Since the firm never bids its maximum willingness to pay, there
may be cases when it is outbid by a firm with a lower willingness to
pay. When this happens, the timber is processed by a high-cost firm.
If the curve GAF intercepts the line KN (where p is unity) at a
point E which is to the left of N, the bidding firm can win all bids by
always bidding slightly more than E. Whether this strategy would be
optimal for the bidding firms depends on whether the potential
profits of (N-E) exceed area ABMX which is the maximum profits
obtainable without winning all bids. Given the high degree of
uncertainty about the costs and bidding strategy of opponents, it is
highly unlikely that the probability-bid curve will intercept the p = I
axis to the left of N.
THE CASE OF A SMALL NUMBER OF BIDDERS
When there is only one bidder sealed bidding is likely to produce
higher returns than oral bidding. The reason is that unless there is
someone to raise a low opening bid, the timber will be sold at the
appraised price. With sealed bidding a bidder may fear that someone
will offer more than the minimum and will himself bid above the
minimum.
The basic mechanism can be illustrated by considering the case of
two identical firms. Assume that opponents' bids are expected to be
4. Before meeting fixed costs.
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ORAL AND SEALED BIDDING
normally distributed. Since both firms are acting from similar
information, it is assumed that the expected distributions of bids for
opponents will be equal (by symmetry).
Let x be the amount bid by a firm, and M its maximum bid.
p is the probability of winning with a bid of x.
Thus, the expected profit is p(x) (M-x), which is maximized for
dp/dx = p(x) / (M-x)
For the case of two identical firms, the only probability of each
winning that is consistent with the assumption that they are identical
is .5 (p = .5). The differential of the cumulative probability function
p(x) is a normal function. If s is the standard deviation of the dis-
tribution, dp/dx where p = .5 is .3989/s from a table of values of the
normal function. Therefore,
dp/dx = p(x) / (M-x) becomes
.3989/s = .5(M-x) and
M-x = .5s/.3989 = 1.258s
In other words, the two firms will eventually settle on a stable
bidding pattern with the distribution of each firm's bids centered 1 /4
standard deviations below its maximum willingness to pay.'
With oral bidding, the two firms would bid each other up until
they were both paying M. Notice that in the case of two identical
firms sealed bidding produces lower revenues to the seller than oral
bidding, and that the difference increases with the uncertainty in
estimating the bids of the competition. The latter effect arises be-
cause greater uncertainty reduces the perceived elasticity of supply
with regard to the amount bid and makes the profit maximizing offer
lower.
In the more general case of two firms with different costs and
hence different willingness to pay the stable pattern of bidding is
more difficult to calculate. The firm with the highest willingness to
pay will win the larger amount of timber and will have the higher
expected value for its bids. The larger the advantage of the efficient
firm the higher its bid and the higher the fraction of the available
timber it will be able to purchase.
BIDDER'S APATHY
Oral bidding is subject to the problem of bidder's apathy. Bidders
become apathetic and cease to bid if they believe that they don't
stand a chance of winning. The most common cause for this situation
5. The gap between M and the revenue derived from the sale is less than 1.258s because the
sale is made at the higher of the two bids received.
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is that another firm has a clear-cut competitive advantage, perhaps a
mill located close to the timber being sold. When firms don't bother
to bid because of apathy the nearby firm can buy the timber for less
than the willingness to pay of the potential second highest bidder.
When all firms except the expected winner are apathetic the timber
will be sold for the appraised price, greatly reducing the government's
revenue.
Theory suggests that this outcome of a single firm being able to
purchase timber for the appraised price should be common. All that
is necessary is (1) for one firm to have a cost advantage which gives it
a consistent advantage in willingness to pay,6 and (2) for the ex-
istence of this advantage to be well known, and (3) for there to be a
finite cost to bidding. These conditions would seem to be commonly
met. Mills normally differ in location and efficiency. These differ-
ences are often well known. And there are costs associated with
bidding such as cruising timber7 and having a man present at the sale.
Indeed, it would not be surprising if bidder apathy eliminated
competition at most sales.
The factor maintaining competition is uncertainty as to how high
another firm is likely to bid. Although some advantages such as
location are apparent, others such as efficiency of labor, access to
other sources of timber, may be unknown. These may be less
apparent but clearly able to outweigh an advantage in the visible
factors. If sales from a particular area are not too common, there
may not have been time enough for the firms to learn that one of
their number will always win. Similarly, where there are frequent
small sales firms may learn that it is futile for them to bid for timber
in certain areas.
The low cost firm may act to encourage a feeling of futility in
competing firms by making it a rule not to be outbid on certain
types of timber land. This is most likely to be attempted when
location or some other cost advantage results in the firm winning
most of the sales in the selected area. The cost of raising the per-
centage won to 100% will be small and the gains large if other firms
can be induced to stop bidding against it.' The chances of success
may be enhanced by informally spreading word that the firm expects
to win all timber within a certain area and that it is a waste of time
to bid against it.9 This can become collusion when combined with an
offer not to bid against firms that don't bid against it.
6. Which implies having adequate capacity to process the entire timber supply.
7. The cruising of timber is the process of estimating the volume and value of timber on a
tract. The cost of doing this is normally significant.
8. And bid on timber in other areas where the 'competing firm does not have an over-
whelming advantage.
9. Mead, supra note 1, at 154. Mead reports several cases of strategies of this type.
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It is difficult to know how important bidder apathy is. A situation
where each firm finds very little competition for timber near its mill
may be due either to widespread bidder apathy or to an agreement
among the firms not to compete.
Mead" 0 has found that only 67.9% of Forest Service timber sales
via oral auctions were made at prices significantly above the
appraised value. Judging from the fact that only 1% of the volume of
timber in the Douglas Fir Region drew no bids, there were probably
at least two firms in most of the non-competitive sales which could
have paid the appraised price. Mead apparently attributes this lack of
competitive behavior to collusion, although the concept of bidder
apathy developed above provides an alternative explanation.
Indeed, Mead'' himself developed a similar concept which he
called bidder futility, although he did not apply it to this problem.
The principal difference between the above argument and that of
Mead is that he regards bidder futility as being felt only by small
firms when faced with the market power of large firms, and uses it to
explain his observation that large firms consistently acquire timber
for lower prices than small firms. However, as shown above, bidder
apathy can arise whenever any firm perceives that it cannot outbid
another firm on certain timber. The firm benefitting from bidder
apathy need not be a large firm; a large firm may decide it is not
worth bidding against a smaller firm which is exceptionally well
located with regard to the timber sought.
Whether bidder apathy is part of the explanation for the lower
prices paid by large firms depends on whether large firms are more
likely to have cost advantages apparent to potentially competing
firms. There are several reasons for believing that this may indeed
happen:
1. Gyppo loggers are small firms without fixed mills who often
log timber for others, but sometimes bid on their own account.
Lacking a fixed mill site they are unlikely to benefit from bidder
apathy.
2. Large mills usually require a large working area. The potential
competition from such mills may discourage other firms from estab-
lishing competing mills within this working radius. This will give the
large mill a stronger locational advantage on timber close to it than
small mills have on timber close to them.
In other words, if a mill can compete for timber 50 miles away, its
willingness to pay for timber one mile away will be higher by the
cost of 49 miles of haulage. This advantage in willingness to pay
10. Mead, supra note 1, at 213. The only mechanism producing non-competitive sales in
the absence of collusion which is discussed is appraisal mistakes.
11. Mead, supra note 1. See ch. 13.
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combined with the longer hauls for competitors may discourage
them from competing for timber near the large mills.
IMPLICIT COLLUSION
Collusion may be either explicit or implicit. With explicit collusion
the colluding firms decide before the bidding who among them will
win and plan their bidding accordingly. With implicit collusion the
firms do not meet but communicate information about their
intentions through the bidding process itself. Such implicit collusion
can even arise accidentally with sealed bidding.
To show this consider the case of two firms, one high cost and one
low cost. Initially both firms bid on all timber. At first the inefficient
firm consistently bids the maximum amount it can, and the efficient
firm takes the timber by bidding just a little bit more. Eventually the
inefficient firm begins to suffer discouragement and drops out of the
bidding. The efficient firm will soon notice this and begin bidding
only slightly above zero.' 2
If the inefficient firm now responds by bidding occasionally the
efficient firm may continue to bid low, allowing the other firm to
win an occasional bid. As long as the inefficient firm doesn't get too
ambitious the two firms can continue to share the timber with both
firms paying virtually nothing.
The profit the efficient firm can earn by consistently bidding
slightly more than the inefficient firm sets an upper limit to the
amount of business the inefficient firm will be allowed to capture.
Let
M be the maximum willingness to pay of the efficient firm
m be the willingness to pay of the inefficient firm
p be the probability of the efficient firm winning
e be the infinitesimal amount by which the winning bid exceeds
the second highest bid
The efficient firm by consistently bidding m + e earns a profit of
(M-m-e).
With a strategy of bidding zero' 3 the efficient firm will earn
average unit profits of pM where p is its probability of winning. This
strategy will prove the profitable strategy only if pM>M-m. Thus, the
condition for cooperation of the efficient firm is that p>M-m. The
M
12. The discussion here assumes that there is no legal required minimum bid such as an
appraised value. In the case where there is the bids mentioned should be interpreted as being
the amounts bid in excess of this legal minimum. For instance, a zero bid then corresponds
to a bid at the appraised price.
13. In practice it would bid a small amount over 0 in order to have the highest bid, but
this detail is not worth elaborating on here.
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maximum fraction of the timber the inefficient firm can capture is
then m/M i.e. 1 - (M-m), giving it profits of m2 /M. This is the best
M
the second firm can do without inducing the efficient firm to adopt a
strategy of winning all bids with a bid of M + e. For the inefficient firm
to realize profits of this magnitude it is necessary for the efficient
firm to acquiesce in all of the gains of the implicit collusion going to
the inefficient firm.
However, it is likely that the efficient firm would realize that its
opponent's bidding strategy depended on the bidding strategy it
adopted. By refusing to bid below m the efficient firm could apply
pressure on the inefficient firm to accept less than m/M of the
timber. Such a concession is necessary if the low cost firm is to have
any incentive for reducing its bidding below m. It is impossible to say
exactly what the outcome of implicit collusion involving the two
firms will be. The typical bid is likely to be zero 4 (or the legal
minimum) because any higher bids do not maximize the joint profits
of the two firms. How these joint profits are divided is indeterminate
with the only constraint being that the higher cost firm cannot win
more than m/M of the bids.
EFFECTS OF IMPLICIT COLLUSION
The effect of implicit collusion on the Federal government is to
reduce its revenues from all timber sales by M. However, not all of
this reduction in Federal revenue accrues to the timber purchasers.
The efficient producer benefits to the extent of M on its purchases of
timber, but the inefficient producer benefits only to the extent of m
on the timber it purchases (due to its higher costs). On timber
purchased by this firm there is an increase of M-m in the cost of
timber processing.
This higher cost of processing represents the efficiency loss from
the implicit collusion. It is proportional to the fraction of the timber
that is purchased by the less efficient firm. In the case where the
inefficient firm captures the maximum amount of timber its increase
in profits from collusion is m(m/M) per unit and the increase in
profits for the efficient firm is M(M-m). Thus the total increase in
M
profits is m2 + M2 -mM per unit. Yet the decrease in government
M
revenue is M. If the decrease in government revenue and the increase
in private profits are both weighted equally, there is a net loss to
14. Or an insignificant amount about zero for the high-cost firm.
July 19721
NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
society equal to the difference between these two sums or m(M-m).
M
This is also the product of the efficiency loss per unit processed by
the less efficient firm (M-m) and the fraction of the harvest it
processes, m/M. The fraction of the loss of revenue to the
government that accrues to the timber purchasers is m2 + M2 -mM.
M2
This function passes through a maximum when the m = 1/2M, and
the benefits to timber purchasers are only 3/4 of the revenue loss to
the government. The other 11 represents a net loss to society. Thus,
at least a quarter of the financial loss to the government is also a net
loss to society.
IMPLICIT COLLUSION WITH MORE THAN TWO FIRMS
Implicit collusion can occur with three or more firms. Let us
consider briefly the case of three. Let
M be the maximum willingness to pay of any of the three firms
m2 be the second highest willingness to pay
m3 be the lowest willingness to pay.
With successful collusion the level of bidding will approach the joint
profit maximizing level of zero (or the appraised price). By the above
argument, to keep the low cost firm from being able to improve its
position by consistently bidding m2 it is necessary that the other
firms limit themselves to winning less than m2 /M of the timber. This
is the same condition as in the two firm case. In addition, if the
second most efficient firm is to be prevented from taking all of the
timber of the two high cost firms by consistently bidding m3 , it is
necessary that the least efficient firm take no more than m3 /m 2 of
the two high cost firms' share of the timber. Beyond these conditions
for insuring that all three firms benefit from the implicit collusion, it
is impossible to predict how the timber will be divided. However, it is
considerably more difficult for three firms to establish and maintain
implicit collusion than for two firms. Any disagreement can result in
the breakdown of the agreement.
EXPLICIT COLLUSION
A primary purpose of the discussion of implicit collusion was to
show that low bids, even zero bids, could result without firms meet-
ing together and agreeing on joint bidding. Of course, such agree-
ments may also be reached directly, giving explicit collusion.
Unfortunately, explicit collusion is actually easier with competitive
bidding than it is in most situations.
[Vol. 12
ORAL AND SEALED BIDDING
Normally, one of the difficult problems in maintaining collusive
agreements is discovering violations. Prices may be shaded by offer-
ing rebates, absorbing freight, raising quality, or making errors in the
customer's favor, as well as by direct price cuts. Because such chisel-
ing is to the benefit of the customer, he has an incentive to keep it
secret. To detect violations of the agreement it is often necessary to
have an elaborate system of reporting and auditing. However, it is
difficult to operate such a system without revealing the agreement to
the antitrust authorities. This makes it difficult to enforce collusive
agreements.
However, this problem is not so difficult in a bidding situation.
Because the firms are all bidding only on price, evasion cannot occur
through secret concessions, rebates, etc. Since bids are made public
during the course of an auction, and usually by law after the opening
of sealed bids, there is no difficulty in discovering and punishing
violators.
As indicated above, with oral bidding it is relatively simple to
maintain a cartel agreement once one has been reached. Unfor-
tunately, such an agreement may be relatively easy to reach too. In
many cases different purchasers of timber have natural supply areas.
All that may be needed for an agreement is, "If you don't bid on
timber in my area, I won't bid in your area."
CHOICE OF BIDDING SYSTEM AND COLLUSION
As has been pointed out by Mead,' ' collusion is more difficult
when bidding is of the sealed type rather than oral. There are several
reasons for this:
1. With sealed bidding there is a risk that a bidder not a party to
the collusive agreement will take advantage of the low bids to win
the timber, making the parties to the agreement worse off. For in-
stance, if two firms agree that one of them will bid $10 per thousand
board feet for timber which could justify bids of $30 while the other
submits an inferior bid, there is a risk that a third firm may be found
to have bid $15 when the bids are opened. With oral bidding, the two
colluding firms may raise their bids if unexpected competition ap-
pears.
2. With sealed bidding the breaking of an agreement by one of the
participants will not be known until the bids are opened. The pri-
mary deterrent to such behavior is having to pay more in the future
for timber due to having caused a breakdown of the agreement.
However, if a sale of timber is large enough, a firm may make more
15. W. Mead, Natural Resource Disposal Policy-Oral Auction Versus Sealed Bids, 7
Natural Resources J. 194,213 (1967).
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on this single sale than it would !ose from a breakdown of the agree-
ment." 6 This is especially likely if a single sale will provide enough
timber for several years operation.' '
With oral bidding, any violation of the agreement is immediately
apparent, and the other parties to the agreement can raise their bids
to prevent the offender from getting the timber, or at least to compel
him to pay a competitive price for it. Thus with oral bidding there is
no incentive to break an agreement.
3. With oral bidding it is easy to bid up any particular firm to
punish it for breaking an agreement. All that is necessary is to raise
the bidding whenever this firm appears. An aggressive policy can
deprive the victim of timber, although this may be at the price of the
attacking firms paying high prices for some timber. A less aggressive
policy may limit itself to forcing the offender to pay competitive or
more than competitive prices. If the attacking firm withdraws from
the bidding before the attacked firm reaches its maximum limit,
substantial penalties can be imposed at low cost to the attacking
firm. Given the ease with which a firm can be bid up, it will be a
brave firm indeed which will do anything to antagonize another firm
in the industry. This power can be used not only to penalize those
violating agreements, but to force uncooperative firms to partici-
pate.' '
With oral bidding it is possible to make the specific threat of
hurting a firm if they ignore the agreement. But with sealed bidding,
the strongest threat is, "If you ignore the agreement, it will hurt all
of us." The worst that can happen to the violator with sealed bidding
is for there to be a return to competitive pricing. Since the damage to
the offender is only a fraction of the total damage, there will be a
strong incentive not to invoke the sanction of a return to competitive
bidding. That "this will hurt us more than it will hurt you" will be
known to any potential violator. The high cost of enforcing a collu-
sive agreement cannot fail to reduce the creditability of threats
against violators.
Suppose the non-joiners are small firms that purchase only a small
fraction of the available timber and hence would bear only a small
16. The phenomenon has been observed in the cement industry. Henry J. Kaiser won the
contract to supply the concrete for building Shasta Dam in California by bidding below the
basing point formula being used by the other producers. Because this contract for 5,800,000
barrels would consume several years output of his intended 2,500,000 barrel plant, he was
willing to risk retaliation or a spate of price competition. See S. Loescher, Imperfect Collu-
sion in the Cement Industry 187 (1959).
17. Incidentally, because of the temptation provided by a large sale, such sales may
actually be less subject to collusive agreements than frequent smaller sales.
18. Of course, a firm might be deliberately bid up to penalize it for other offenses such
as raising wages, cutting lumber prices, or violating an agreement on sealed bidding.
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part of the increased cost of a return to competitive bidding. In this
case there will be a strong temptation for the other firms to allow
such small firms to remain outside the agreement on the argument
that profits are greater with an imperfectly observed agreement than
with no agreement at all. Over time more and more small firms will
come to operate under the umbrella provided by the agreement.
Eventually, the agreement is brought down. In contrast, with oral
bidding, selective retaliation against violators prevents such erosion
of an agreement.' 9
OTHER FORMS OF BIDDING
So far the discussion has concentrated merely on the advantages of
oral versus competitive bidding. It was shown that oral bidding
would normally lead to the most efficient processing of the re-
sources, and the greatest gross national product. Either might bring
the greatest revenue to the government depending on the number of
bidders and the difference in their willingness to pay. However, collu-
sive bidding is much more likely with oral bidding than with sealed
bidding.
Fortunately, there are other methods of sale that can be adopted
besides conventional oral and sealed bidding. Some of these have
advantages which may make them preferable to either.
THE DUTCH AUCTION
What has been here referred to as merely oral bidding is also
known as an "English auction." Bidding starts low and progresses
upwards. With the Dutch auction the auctioneer starts with a high
price which is gradually lowered until a taker is found. The signifi-
cant difference with the English system is that there can be no re-
sponding to opponent's bids. Thus, in its effects this sales procedure
is very similar to conventional sealed bidding. Like sealed bidding,
the less efficient firm will often fail to win because of underestima-
ting the competition. Although the bidding is verbal, there is no way
for members of a bidding cartel to adjust their bidding strategy to
the bids of outsiders. Thus the risk of bids being collusive with a
Dutch auction is very similar to the risk with sealed bidding. The
only difference is that it may be possible to gain some information
about the possibility of bidding by non-members of the agreement
from who attends the sale. The appearance of a known representative
of a non-member of the agreement may lead to abandonment of the
19. The process described above for sealed bidding is similar to that which eventually
destroys many price fixing cartels. The difficulty of retaliating against a small firm leads to
the toleration of some price cutting which increases until the cartel is destroyed.
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agreed low bid for a higher bid. Likewise, if there is no one present
but participants in the bidding agreement it is safe to bid low. Usu-
ally, however, outsiders will be represented by stand-ins and there
will be a number of unknown people present at any auction. When
this happens, little information can be obtained from who is physi-
cally present at an auction and the ease of collusion comes to
resemble closely that in conventional sealed bidding.
While a Dutch auction does not allow response to the specific bids
of competitors, it does allow response to which parcels are being
won. A small firm which desires to bid on only part of the lots being
sold is at a disadvantage in a sealed bid sale. It dare not bid on all of
the parcels offered for fear that it will win all or most of them and
either be physically unable to exploit them or financially unable to
pay for them. Yet by bad luck it may fail to win any of the desired
resources. In an auction sale, whether "English" or ."Dutch" the
bidding strategy for one parcel does not have to be selected until it
knows whether it has won other sales. This makes it easier to buy the
desired quantity of a resource. For mineral resources this advantage
involves the risk that a firm might be deterred from bidding high on
early parcels for fear of revealing a high valuation of deposits extend-
ing over several parcels.
In general a Dutch auction is equivalent to sealed bidding where
the bids on unsold parcels can be changed upon seeing the results of
sales of earlier parcels.
A SALES STRATEGY TO PROMOTE EFFICIENCY
It was shown that oral bidding (where the most efficient firm can
always outbid its competitors) will cause natural resource exploita-
tion to be done by the low cost firms. This advantage in efficiency is
partially offset by the ease with which collusion can arise in an oral
bidding situation. This naturally leads to a search for a sales system
which retains the efficiency advantage of oral bidding but is less
prone to collusion.
There is such a system. Each firm submits prior to the sale a
statement of the maximum amount it is willing to pay (hereafter
referred to as the bid). At an appointed time the bids are opened and
the tract is sold to the firm with the highest bid. However, the price
is the amount specified in the second highest bid. This system awards
the timber to the firm with the highest willingness to pay. This will
normally be the firm able to process the resource at the lowest cost.
The price paid is the maximum willingness to pay of the other firms.
Because the price paid for the timber is not the "bid" of the winner
but that of the runner up, there is not the incentive to conceal one's
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willingness to pay that there is in a system where the amount paid is
the amount bid.
In oral bidding each firm sends a representative to the auction
with instructions to bid up to a certain amount. The firm that has
given its representative the highest maximum amount will win the
bidding. However, to win, its representative will have to bid only an
infinitesimal amount above the upper limit of the representative with
the second highest upper limit. Thus, the sale is made to the firm
with the highest upper limit but at essentially the maximum willing-
ness to pay of the second highest bidder.
In the proposed system, the firm instead of giving its upper limit
to a representative at the auction, sends the upper limit to the gov-
ernment. The government simulates an auction, awarding the sale to
the firm with the highest upper limit, and setting the price at the
upper limit of the second highest firm. This is done without the
expense of actually holding an auction. Thus, the proposed bidding
system will be referred to as simulated oral bidding. Let us see now
what advantages it may offer besides economy.
SIMULATED ORAL BIDDING'S VULNERABILITY TO COLLUSION
With simulated oral bidding, collusion is less likely because bids
are submitted before it is known who the other firms are, or how
much they are bidding. There is no way to retaliate against specific
firms, because there is no way to know who will ultimately be the
high bidder. Thus, a violator of an agreement or a firm bidding
outside of its usual territory cannot be penalized by being selectively
bid up. This makes it much harder to maintain collusive agreements,
especially the type that say, "I won't bid against you if you don't bid
against me."
The proposed bidding system is less effective in eliminating the
incentive to collusive bidding provided by the ability to raise the bid
if an outsider enters the bidding, or if a member of the agreement
bids more than agreed. This case is discussed in the Appendix.
Thus simulated oral bidding will achieve the efficiency gains of
oral bidding while reducing the risk of collusive bidding. Whether it
will yield more or less revenue depends on the circumstances, al-
though when profit taxes, individual income taxes, and inheritance
taxes are included it is likely that seeking economic efficiency will
also produce the highest total revenue to the government.
OTHER FEATURES OF SIMULATED ORAL BIDDING
The simulated oral bidding procedure yields information on the
willingness to pay of timber users rather than just a series of values
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for the amounts that they did pay. This willingness is the sum of the
amount paid and their economic profit (revenue minus a marginal
cost including the minimum return on capital required). There are
many uses for this information. One that has already been mentioned
is in setting refusal prices in cases of suspected collusion.
The increment in gross national product resulting from the proc-
essing of timber is the willingness to pay revealed by the proposed
bidding system. The optimum timber management policy requires
that investments in timber production be made if the increase in
national income exceeds the cost of the investment. The proposed
bidding system generates the information needed for implementation
of this principle.
The sales values resulting from implementation of either a simple
oral or sealed bidding system are less useful in guiding forest manage-
ment policy. Where there is collusion both oral and sealed bids will
understate the real value to the economy of standing timber. If there
is only one purchaser, perhaps because of the location of the timber,
oral or sealed bids understate the value of the timber. In other cases
traditional bids reflect not only estimates of the "value" of timber
but estimates of the amounts other firms would be willing to offer.
These estimates of potential competition tend to be highly variable.
The result is that amounts actually bid may not even be proportional
to the value of the timber as estimated by the different firms. The
resulting prices will not be accurate indications of the values of
different stands, and the priority that should be accorded to protect-
ing and improving them. The basic problem with using the amount
bid is the exclusion of the expected "economic" profit from process-
ing the timber. Use for management purposes of a measure of willing-
ness to pay eliminates this difficulty.
ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
The administrative costs of simulated oral bidding should be low.
Because the bids are written there is no need to send expensive
personnel to the auction sale. Indeed, the cost of bidding may be
lower than for sealed bidding. With sealed bidding, it is necessary to
first determine the maximum one is willing to pay for a parcel, and
then evaluate the strength of the competition before bidding. With
simulated oral bidding, one need only estimate the maximum one is
willing to pay.
INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN BIDS
Where a number of parcels are being sold, both simulated oral
bidding and sealed bidding make it difficult to purchase the amount
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desired. With bids on all parcels, there is the risk of having purchased
more than is wanted or can be paid for. With bids on just a few, there
is the risk of winning none. This problem is especially serious for
small firms which may lack the ability to handle more than a few
parcels.
The essence of the problem is that the amount that a firm is
willing to pay depends on how much it has already purchased. With
conventional oral bidding a firm can adjust its bidding to the success
it has already enjoyed. When it has won all it wants, it may stop
bidding or reduce its bids. Likewise, if it is winning less than ex-
pected it may increase the level of its bidding.
The solutions for this problem are basically the same for both
sealed and simulated oral bidding. The simplest is not to offer a large
number of parcels at one sale but to hold frequent smaller sales. Even
within one day, a large sale may be broken into a number of smaller
sales with the bid openings being spaced far enough apart to permit
bids to be changed in response to the outcome of earlier sales. 2 0
Another possibility is to tabulate the amount purchased by each of
the bidding firms and to allow each firm to provide a maximum limit
for its purchases. Once this limit has been reached, all other bids by
that firm are disregarded.
BIDDING METHODS AND BIDDER APATHY
The problem of bidder apathy is almost a necessary consequence
of an efficient bidding system. Any system which consistently leads
to the most efficient firm winning the sale will prove discouraging to
the less efficient firms. With oral bidding and simulated oral bidding
the firm with the highest willingness to pay will always win. This is
likely to lead to other firms dropping out as soon as they perceive
that they will not win.
The problem of bidder apathy is not serious with sealed bidding.
As indicated above, the profit maximizing strategy for the efficient
firm involves bidding low enough so that it will occasionally be out-
bid by other firms. These occasional victories by the less efficient
firms will give them an incentive to continue bidding.
Bidder apathy is reduced but not eliminated by sealed bidding.
The profits to the less efficient firm from only an occasional victory
may be less than the cost of bidding in all sales. When this happens,
the less efficient firm drops out of the bidding due to apathy. The
risk that the efficient firm may adopt a strategy of consistently
bidding high in the hope that other firms will stop bidding is small.
20. Of course, this requires that the closing times for submitting bids for one sale be after
the announcing of the winners for the earlier sale.
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For the efficient firm to benefit from this strategy it must eventually
lower its bids or be so successful that the competition is driven out
of business.2' These lower bids will, in turn, attract the competition
back.
If the cost of submitting a bid is a, and the expected profit from
having the bid prove successful is b, the firm will bid as long as the
probability of winning exceeds a/b. With a probability of success
lower than this, the profit maximizing strategy is not to bid. Thus,
the problem of bidder apathy can be reduced by reducing the cost of
submitting bids.
There are many ways the cost of bidding can be reduced. The
current Forest Service procedure requires that bidders qualify for a
sale by first submitting a written bid equal to at least the appraised
price of the timber. This raises the price of bidding and increases the
risk of bidder apathy. On the other hand, having the government
cruise the timber and announce the quantity involved can eliminate
the cost of each private firm cruising the timber.2 2 Deposits should
be limited to the absolute minimum. Permanent deposits applicable
for all sales, or contracts providing for recourse against fixed assets of
bidders who do not honor their bids can be used. These reduce the
marginal cost of qualifying for a particular sale to zero for most
firms. They encourage firms with only a small expectation of win-
ning to submit bids. Auctions at which several parcels are sold may
encourage firms to bid on parcels they do not expect to win. If the
firm must have a representative present in any case, the added cost of
bidding on timber that has already been Federally cruised may be
negligible. An effort by the Federal government to reduce the cost of
bidding would reduce the cases in which bidder apathy results in loss
of revenue.
One way of reducing the cost of bidding would be to adopt a
system of simulated oral bidding. This eliminates the need to send
qualified representatives to the sale and encourages firms to bid on
timber they do not expect to win. With simulated oral bidding it
would be desirable to keep the identity of unsuccessful bidders secret
but make public the amounts bid. This protects them from worry
about retaliation and encourages them to bid while providing an
honesty check against the auctioneer.
With simulated oral bidding it is possible to supply an incentive for
bidding even when a firm is certain it will not win. This can be done
by offering a small cash reward to the second highest bidder (perhaps
21. And even here there is a substantial risk of new entrance as soon as the price bid is
lowered to take advantage of the absence of competition.
22. Cruising is the process of estimating the value of standing timber.
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a percentage of its bid). Because the bids are in a written form it is
possible to determine who the second highest bidder is and pay him.
With an oral auction such a payment would be impracticable. If the
payment to the second highest bidder exceeds the cost of preparing a
bid there will be at least two bidders (assuming that there are at least
two firms willing to pay at least the appraised price for the timber).
Competition among firms for the payment to the second highest
bidder will serve to raise the level of these bids and hence to raise the
revenue from sale of the timber to the highest bidder. Thus simulated
oral bidding can be modified to eliminate the problem of bidder
apathy.
BIDDING SYSTEMS FOR PETROLEUM AND OTHER MINERAL LEASES
Most of the discussion so far can be applied to sales of mineral
resources as well as to timber. However, sales of minerals typically
have features which influence the type of bidding employed. One is
that only part of the Federal revenues come from bonuses, the bulk
of the remainder come from royalties. The Federal government col-
lects as royalties an eighth of the value of petroleum produced from
the onshore public land, and a sixth of the value of production from
the offshore lands. In 1971 the United States government collected the
appreciable sum of $265,900,000 in oil and gas royalties.2 Thus
the maximization of Federal revenues requires considering not only
the amounts paid initially for the leases, but the expected values of
future royalties. These are determined by the amount of production
from the lands, and indirectly by the amount of exploration.
There is a wide variation in estimates of the probability of finding
petroleum on different leases. This is evidenced by the large differ-
ence typically found between the winning and the second highest bid
for mineral leases. Mead has reported that for oil and gas lease sales
the ratio of the high to second highest bids averaged 1.91.2 4
While part of the variation may be due to differences in estimates
of the competition, it is likely that the most important factor is
differences in the estimated chance of finding petroleum, and the
size of discovery expected. It is desirable to award leases for unex-
plored lands to the firm which has the most ambitious exploratory
program, and which presumedly is the most likely to find oil. One
way to do this is to require all bidders to commit themselves to
exploratory programs in advance, and then to select the firm with
23. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Public Land Statistics, Table
114 (1971). Virtually all of the Geological Survey receipts deposited to the Bureau of Land
Management accounts represent royalties.
24. Mead, supra note 15, at 212.
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the most ambitious programs. This is administratively difficult as a
large number of plans must be examined in detail, and there is usu-
ally scope for dispute as to which is most likely to be successful.
Such an "exploratory effort" bidding can also be very inefficient.
Firms may commit themselves to conduct more than the optimal
amount of exploration. For instance, a well-defined structure may
require only a single well for testing, but if the chances of that well
being successful are high enough, firms may promise a second un-
needed well in order to win permission to drill the first well. An
efficient exploratory program must be a highly flexible one with the
strategy being constantly adjusted to the results from earlier stages.
With "exploratory effort" bidding there are likely to be times when
the results of the first wells or the initial seismic work suggest that
further expenditure is not justified, but the firm has committed itself
to doing more. The problems with "exploratory effort" bidding lead
one to search for a better way of discovering which firms will con-
duct the most energetic search for oil.
The firms most likely to conduct an ambitious exploratory pro-
gram are generally those who are most optimistic about finding oil.
This optimism may be measured by their estimates of the expected
value of the profits from the tract. The expected value of profits is
not only a determinant of exploratory effort, but, as indicated
above, it is also a determinant of the amounts that will be bid for
leases. Thus, competitive bidding will be an efficient way for assign-
ing exploratory rights to firms that will look hardest for the oil. This
is a powerful argument for assigning leases by competitive bidding
instead of the non-competitive system used for most of the public
domain.2 "
However, some methods of competitive sale are more effective
than others in selecting firms likely to look energetically for oil. The
expected profit from a tract is nothing but the firm's willingness to
pay discussed earlier. As shown then both oral bidding and simulated
oral bidding award the lease to the firm with the highest willingness
to pay. These will be the firms with the most optimistic assessment
of the chances of finding oil, and hence the most ambitious explora-
tory program. However, with sealed bidding there is a chance the
25. For most public domain lands which become available for leasing through expiration
or relinquishment of leases a provision in the law requiring that the lease be issued to the
first applicant has been interpreted such that all applications filed within a specified period
are considered simultaneous and the successful applicant determined by drawing. These
lotteries sometimes attract several thousand applicants with the bulk of the applicants
intending to sell their leases if successful. The author discusses at great length the simul-
taneous filing system (as this method of non-competitive public land disposal is known) in
Study of Energy Fuel Mineral Resources for the Public Land Law Review Commission, a
Report by Abt Associates.
I[Vol. 12
ORAL AND SEALED BIDDING
competition will be underestimated and the lease awarded to a firm
not planning an ambitious exploratory program.
Consider the situation where one firm believes that the chance of
finding oil is sufficiently good to justify sinking a well. Suppose it is
competing with a less optimistic firm whose intention is merely to
hold the lease undrilled in the hope that a nearby discovery would
make the lease valuable. From the government's viewpoint it is desir-
able to get as many leases as possible into the hands of firms of the
first type, for only if the leases are drilled does it have any chance of
receiving royalties. Yet with sealed bidding there will be a certain
number of cases in which the optimistic firm loses, and the specula-
tor wins. This should not happen with either oral bidding or simula-
ted oral bidding.
Thus, when selling exploration rights for minerals, the government
will maximize royalty revenues (but not necessarily bonus revenues)
if it uses oral or simulated oral bidding rather than sealed bidding. In
addition, these two bidding methods serve to get the leases into the
hands of the firm with the lowest costs, or highest potential returns.
A firm may have unusually low costs because of possession of a
drilling rig near the lease, or one suited to the specific conditions to
be encountered. A firm may also have a cost advantage because of
possession of adjacent leases. In general, costs will be lower, and
recovery higher, if adjacent leases can be operated as a unit.
BIDDING SYSTEMS FOR PURCHASING GOODS
The arguments presented above in the context of sales of govern-
ment-owned resources can be easily applied to purchases of goods
and services. Here, the winner is the firm that submits the lowest bid.
The lowest price a firm is willing to quote will usually be its marginal
cost. Where there is substantial excess capacity this marginal cost
may include little more than materials and labor. Where there is a
shortage of capacity it will include a substantial premium for divert-
ing production facilities from other uses.
The policy arguments dealing with purchases of goods and services
are similar to those for sales of government-owned resources. There
will often be differences between suppliers in their marginal costs.
For bulky products such as cement or petroleum some suppliers will
be better located than others. In many cases possession of special
equipment or special knowledge will make a particular supplier the
low cost one for filling certain orders. In other cases one firm is
simply more efficient than the other firms because of more nearly
optimal size, or better management. If the goal is to maximize na-
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tional income it is necessary that production, including that for sale
to the government, be done by the most efficient firms.
In general the government has an interest in having production for
it done at the lowest marginal cost. The sellers of goods and services
to the government are citizens whose welfare should be of interest to
the government. Even if it isn't, the government as beneficial recipi-
ent of about half of corporate profits has a strong interest in award-
ing contracts to the firms most likely to make a profit. In addition,
there are personal income taxes on dividends, capital gains taxes, and
inheritance taxes to be considered.
When contracts are awarded using oral bidding or simulated oral
bidding, the contract will go to the lowest estimate of its marginal
cost.2 6 This will usually be the firm with the lowest actual marginal
cost and the highest potential profit. With sealed bidding, which is
traditionally used for government procurement, there will be cases in
which the order will not go to the firm with the lowest bid. Thus
from the viewpoint of economic efficiency sealed bidding may be a
poor way to award contracts.
It is impossible to say which bidding method will bring the govern-
ment the lowest costs. In general, if the marginal costs of the bidders
are close together and there is effective competition the best prices
will probably result from oral, or simulated oral bidding. With bid-
ders with widely differing marginal costs sealed bidding is likely to
bring the best price. Here the most efficient firm is likely to bid
above the marginal cost of the second most efficient firm. Where
there are only a few bidders oral bidding may end in collusion.
APPENDIX: SIMULATED ORAL BIDDING, COLLUSION,
AND OUTSIDE ENTRY
A likely bidding strategy for members of a bidding group is for the selected winner to
make a high bid at the maximum amount he is willing to pay, and then for the other firms
to make no bids or token bids. If no non-member bids, the selected firm will win the
bidding and will pay a low price for the timber. If a non-member enters the bidding the
selected winner may still win but he will have to pay the amount that the outsider was
willing to pay if such an outside bid exceeds the second highest collusive bid. This is
different from the situation with sealed bidding where the member of a bidding group is
bidding low because he must pay the amount he bids. Here, there is always a risk that a
non-member of the group will enter the bidding and win. This deters attempts to take the
timber with extremely low bids.
However, the members of the bidding group may not adopt the strategy of having the
firm selected to win bid high. It is suspicious for a firm to bid as if it was desperate for
timber at one time and then not to bid at all at other times or to submit only a token bid.
Such behavior will serve as a sign to antitrust authorities that there is probably a bidding
26. The relevant marginal cost may or may not include the cost of capital depending on
whether there is excess capacity at the time.
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agreement, and will encourage those responsible for setting minimum acceptable prices to
set high prices.
To avoid these responses the members of the bidding agreement may reduce their maxi-
mum bids. Once this is done they are no longer certain of winning if an outsider enters the
bidding. This will in turn lead them to raise their second highest bids to reduce the profits
which such an outsider would receive, and hence to reduce the outsider's incentive to bid.
The final effect is to compress the margin between the high bid (which determines who
wins) and the second highest bid (which determines how much he pays): as these two bids
come closer together the bidding pattern comes to resemble that with sealed bidding in
which the limit to the power of a bidding group is set by fear of entry of non-members.
However, defense against collusive bidding rests only partially on the bidder's own behav-
ior. Because firms are revealing their maximum willingness to pay information is available to
set refusal prices which leave only a small margin for collusion. Because a firm does not pay
the amount of its maximum bid it is willing to reveal its willingness to pay. Thus the
government can set a refusal price a bit below the typical maximum bid. The motive of not
encouraging the government to raise its refusal price will be weak as long as any one firm
wins only a small fraction of the sales, and bears only a small fraction of the costs arising
from an increase in the government's refusal price. It will be much more concerned with
assuring that it buys the timber desired than protecting the interests of the "industry" in a
low government refusal price. Indeed, as long as sales are competitive, the government
refusal price is likely to be below the second highest bid where it has no effect on the actual
sales price.
However, if the actions of a bidding group produce a situation in which the second
highest bid is consistently far below the highest bid (suggesting collusion), although differ-
ent firms are making the high bids, the government may take this as a signal to raise its
refusal price. For instance, if in a particular area the high bids were consistently $35-$45
regardless of who submitted the high bid, and the other bids clustered around $5-$10, the
government would have a clear sign that it could raise its refusal price without much risk of
not selling the timber. This differs from the situation with sealed bidding where prices
would be low and would give no indication that more could be charged. (As discussed
earlier, if bidders attempt to limit their maximum bids they run a risk of being outbid by
outsiders and the situation resembles that in sealed bidding.)
It should be noted that to the extent that firms limit their bids in order to prevent the
government from raising the refusal price, the ability of the bidding system to sell the
timber to the most efficient firm is reduced. A less efficient firm may purchase the timber
with a higher bid. However, with a competitive situation a firm is unlikely to lower its
maximum bid for the sake of discouraging the government from raising its refusal price if
there is much chance that this would cause it to be outbid." A bidding group whose
members bear all the private loss from increases in the refusal price has a stronger incentive
to reduce their bids. However, the efficiency loss from this behavior is likely to be small
because which mills get which timber is being decided within the group rather than through
operation of the bidding system.
Only in the case where a large and consistent gap between the highest and second highest
bids is due to there being a single firm for which timber is unusually valuable (perhaps
because of location in relation to the mill) will a policy of raising the refusal price be likely
to lead to inefficiencies. This situation can be recognized by the same firm consistently
being the high bidder, in contrast to the bidding group situation where this position is
rotated. The high bidder, because he bears the entire loss from any increase in the refusal
price, has a strong incentive to conceal his willingness to pay by bidding low. At worst, a
lower limit to his bids is set by the threat of being outbid by other firms. In this limiting
case his bidding strategy becomes identical to that which he would follow if sealed bidding
was being used, and the efficiency losses are the same. These losses can be avoided by a
government policy of not raising refusal prices in cases of this type.
27. This is because it bears all of the cost of being outbid, but only part of any losses
from having the government's refusal price raised.
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